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LAWRENCE HAWORTH, uRIGHTS, WRONGS, AND 
ANIMALS"; MICHA~L A, FOX, "ANIMAL LIB­-
ERATION: A CRITIQUE"; PETER SINGER, "THE 
FABLE OF THE FOX AND THE UNLIBERATED 
ANIMALS"; TOM REGAN, "FOX'S CRITIQUE OF 
ANIMAL LIBERATION"; MICHAEL A. FOX, 
"ANIMAL SUFFERING AND RIGHTS"; ETHICS (JANUARY, 1978), PP, 95-138. 
Ethics, a scholarly journal of social, polit­-
ical and legal philosophy published by the 
University of Chicago Press, added status to 
the discussion of animals' rights by featuring 
it in its January, 1978, issue. The lead 
article by Lawrence Haworth sets the ana­-
lytical posture by distinguishing "rights for 
humans Ot non-humans" from "rights as guides 
for human behavior", a distinction partic­-
ularly rele'lant to the philosophy of law. 
Hichael Fox (Queens University, Ontario) 
comes down entirely for the latter use of the 
term. Peter Singer (Animal Liberation) and 
Tom P.egan ("The Moral Basis ot Vegetarianism") 
reply. tVhile the debate is good reading,
understandably there is no resolution, if only 
because conte'!1porary ethics has made little 
progress out of the absolutist/pragmatist con­-
trov~rsy which the pheno~enol08ists, beginning 
with Nietzsche, attempted to bypass by placing 
it in the perspective of actual human existence. 
Interes~tngly, one of the books reviewed in 
this same. ssue of Ethics was Stephen Clark's 
The Moral Status of Animals whic~, in a con­-
fusing way, almosC-says that some sort of 
non-Kantian and non-utilitarian solution to 
the nature of animals' rights is appropriate. 
This reviewer feels that Clark would move 
beyond Singer and Regan if he was less bur­-
dened by the need to frame his ideas in the 
perspective of Christian Thought. 
Returning to the principal articles in 
Ethics (Vol. 88, #2), one might suggest 
asking certain questions when reading them. 
If three philosophers all decide to abstain 
from eating meat, but for different reasons-­-
fear of bowel cancer, respect for life, and 
a rational balancing of interests, respec­-
tively,--are all three of them equally 
"moral"? Secondly, do such questions 
have any meaning? 
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